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A PSYCHOLOGY OF
CONFRONTATION
BY BARBARA HAUPT

Modern psychology has often been embarrassed by a certain wellted skeleton for which Descartes ultimately gets the blame. This
ton is the bifurcation of human consciousness from the "real"
erfd-or to play slightly upon the words, a modem instance of
w;pping the flesh from the spirit. Since Locke and Leibniz, each
5
bool of psychology has invented its own formula for restoring the
:.ity of man, but most of these have had to compete with the current
vocabulary. And the vocabularies have ·p ut man into contrasting
dimensions-subjectivity and objectivity, secondary and primary qualities, feeling and reality, mind and matter.
Today a new movement in philosophy and psychology-phenomenology-emphasizes the phenomenon as the meeting point of I
and World. It treats consciousness in its lively encounter with the
ureal" world without reducing it "naturalistically" to the stuff of the
world. Phenomenology has many of its roots in the complex history of
mental and behavioral analysis. Many psychological systems have
tentatively treated some of the aspects of behavior that phenomenology
now claims as its special problems: the person's modes of encountering
existence.
Some of the seventeenth and eighteenth century English thinkers
observed ways in which the act of perception itself colored or formed
what persons saw; and Gestalt psychologists in the twentieth century
supplemented these observations in their "field" theory. German
thinkers from the eighteenth century to the present ascribed various
powers of forming percepts directly to the mind or brain. Phenomenologists, unlike contemporary behaviorists, interbeh,aviorists, neoFreudians and biosocial psychologists, treat behavior as it reveals
this peculiar fact about consciousness: the coloration or meaning
that phenomena typically take on for a human being confronting them.
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This event of confrontation came into the spotlight for
psychology through the works of Edmund Husser!, who
and transformed the b·adition of German psychology. M
today's practicing psychologists and psychiab·ists, particu~)'
Europe, have accepted and modified his assertions; and t..;
knowledge him as the father of the new movement.
"
In_ his Id~~s of ..Pu~e Z:,henomenology ( 1928) Husser) states
conscwusness and Bemg are the same thing in his science, and
they cannot be reduced to the categories of the empirical sciences
aims to dislodge ~e "bias of naturalism" from the study of co~
ness. In Husserl_s _system,. the r~al world receives its meaning
phenomena or ex1sting reahty ( selende) only as the intentional
ing-p~·od~ct of an ego. ~. reality exists through "the dispensing
meanm~ by a sense-glvmg consciousness. This consciousness
somethmg abs?lute, not ~er~vative from a nervous system, sensorfuat.
compl~x of ~~:e~ or socml_ mte~·course as every type of physiolog~eaJ
~ehavwral, hbidmal or bwsoc1al psychology would have it. It
mdependent of meanings bestowed categorically upon it from another
som·ce.
J:Iusserl ~ol~s ~hat consciousness as such grasps the objectively
real m ~e~tam lim1ted forms, which cannot be studied empirically
by an~lytz~?g the sb·u:tme of .?~jects, but only "phenomenologically •
That IS, a pme conscwusness 1tseU, a person standing in conscioua.
ness and not a te~hnician working from the outside, must analya
the. forms of consciOusness. These are specifically the varying modes
of time, space, matter and casuality.
Husser! assigns to phenomenology "its own proper preserve•
beyond the "positive sciences." It arrives there by the unique method
he_ names "~idetic phenomenological reduction." The first step iJl
th1s method IS to put the entire natural world "in brackets"-that is,
to take nothing for granted about phenomena. The next is to coocentrate on what remains-the "phenomenological" forms of experience,
form_s not adopted from "factual" experiences (Faktizitaeten). ID
seeking these forms the analyst tries to determtne how phenomeaa
typically present themselves to a normal ego; he seeks the essential
forms of all possible empiiical facts, not generalizations from empirical
facts.
Husserl distinguishes essential form or eidos from individual
existence. Several experienced objects may share a specific essencea form or meaning they have for a person-but each has its own
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ble existence. To discover the eidos, Husserl examines
normal consciousness does to the reality it confronts or,
what t e·sc what reality does to the normal consciousness. What,
h revet '
h 1h
· d
I c k are the eidetic phenomenological forms? The ea t y mm ,
he as. ds
s, experiences time, space, matter an d casua l't
·
t y m spect'ftc
he .f10. to ' alter these is to a1ter a person' s "rea l'ty
"
Ph
· 1
1 •
enomeno1ogtca
"'a)s, · ts today examine the diseased personality for deviations from
thcrapJs
.
. .
p h ·
they have estabhshed as the normal etdetic pattern. syc otic
what
. di 'duals they discover, vary ra di ca lly f rom compara ti've1y norma l
Ill VI
. .
in ' the way they apply these forms, an d the vanation
ten d s
0115
pc~c consistent for a given type of behavior disorder.
10
How does a person form experience eidetically? Husser! contends that "pure consciousness" performs "intentional acts" in which
't attention is directed to real objects and grasps them as phenomena1th·a't i ·, in certain perspectives ( Abschattt~ngen). He agrees. with
.
Brcntano that attention determines the reality of a perception;. tt
sives the perception Aktualitaet. Many sensory data present dunng
an intentional act are merely marginal. Not focusing to a consciousness of something, they are "dormant actualities" (Ina.ktualitaten ).
ome entire experiences are not intentional because in them the
consciousness is not directed to anything. The ego must meaningfully
"glance toward" an object before an intentional experience, or cogito,
can occur. On the other hand, in order for a cogito to take place
it is necessary onltJ that the ego confront something; the object need
not be real. Thus, as 1einong had maintained, not only perception
but also fancy, will and approval are cogitos. Apprel1ended objects, on
the other hand, are "objectified" intentional objects.
Before Husser!, psychologists treated the subject of attention
scnsationistically, concerning themselves primarily with separate senory reports, and collecting data about the physical conditions for
perception. But he insists upon the unity of apprehension and thus
continues the tradition of Kant and Herbart, who on this point
opposed Locke and HlUlle and their successors. He assumes, unlike
many contemporary psychologists, that the facts about conscious
experience are of a different kind altogether than "natmalistic" data
about the physical world.
Husser! draws a sharp distinction between Being as Experience
and Being as Thing. Like the nineteenth-century phenomenalists,
he considers the starting place for knowledge to be the immediate,
immanent experience. This experience guarantees the existence of
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its object and of an absolute self. As a person feels himself .
10
stream of experience, confronting an intentional object, he kn
· means at once I grasp (something) and I live. Like
ows
he ·
IS. cogito
temporary phenomenologists, Husserl insists that, though in
ing a~ object the ego experiences itself as absolutely real i...t,lJhaslltr()JIIil~
essential components apart from its way of being related or
no
be~avin~. Present-day pheno~1enological therapy takes as its ~
pomt this fact of confrontation-the way the person encount
world of things and people.
ers
In discussing phenomenological time (experienced time
t-Lthan clock time), Husser} emphasized the unity of the s~eara~
.
consciOusness,
a f act th at William James and Henri B !Uaf
also found important. Each new experience takes place in a =~
peculiar to the particular ego. Two individuals' streams of cons:
ness have unlike essential contents. Thus the same Faktizataet occurs
OUJ.
~ different phenomenon for eac.h individual, and its peculiarity she:
~Ight on the nature of the entire sh·eam of consciousness in which
It occms.
Modern phenomenology takes up mental disorder at this point.
It attempts. to .determine the character of the stream of consciousnea
or the su~Jectlve ~orld of the patient in terms of specific essences
or categones pecuhar to human consciousness. His distortion of one
or more. o~. ~hese known. forms of consciousness may provide the key
to pecuhantie~ of behaviOr that cannot be adequately understood by
more ~onve~tional ~ethods of delving into the person's past or
companng his behavior with well-known syndromes.
s~~ne. of the psychia~·ists who today are applying phenomenolog.
Ical pimcipl~s to psychtah·y are Eugene Minkowski and Henri F.
E~enberger m France; Erwin W. Sh·aus, now in Kentucky; Baron
VIktor von Gebsattel in Germany; Ludwig Binswanger in Switzerlan_d and Rollo May in New York. In his book on the new movement,
Existence ( 1958) May has included articles by each of these men in
which they eA1Jlain their theory and practice and submit case re~rts.
.
E.llen~erger outlines the three main types of phenomenological
mvestigation now being carried on. The first of these is descriptive
phenomenology. This approach is an attempt to describe carefully and
accmately the subjective experiences of mentally ill persons and so
to form a ~omprehensive impression of the world they actually live in.
Th~ psychiatrist takes the statements of the patient at face value, not
trymg to reduce them to what the patient "really" means or to interpret
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"transference" phenomena. As he listens to his patient, he
thc!Tl a~ correlate items in the report with any preconceived schemata.
does n~ he may make the most effective discoveries by letting himself
In fa? the "feel'' of the derangement that confronts him; he may
~cq~ur( einfuhln) what is amiss long before he can verbalize it.
1
ntul: second type is genetic-structural phenomenology, developed by
. kowski and von Gebsattel. Its aim is to define the basic disturb·
d erangement m
· one of th e f orms by
•\hn •
the consciOusness-a
10
ance
which one encounters or is encountered by the world-an d to trace a ll
of the patient's symptoms and the content of his consciousness to
this one disturbance.
Minkowski analyzes the case of a schizophrenic depressive Frenchan who lived under the nauseating delusion that the whole world
:as in alliance to punish him for his "guilt" by saving up scraps and
leftovers of every imaginable kind in order to stuff them all inside
him on a certain fateful date unknown to him. Minkowski discovered,
by Jiving with the patient day and night for several months, that the
man lived in a world that had a peculiar sb·ucture of its own, a
distortion of the normal phenomenal world of time and consequently
of space.
The man suffered from a paralyzing sense that all meaningful
time progression had stopped; his life centered on a single fatal focal
point, the date of which was unknown to him but imminent at every
instant of his existence. His retribution was planned, by hostle forces;
everything was planned. There was nothing left for him to do but pick
out the pieces of the scheme and discover new evidences of it everywhere around him. He spent his time determining new sources of b·ash
that could be used against him. By feeding his delusion he was devouring his own life, his sense of moving creatively into the future.
~finkowski attacked the illness at what he considered to be the
aggravating instant-the distortion of the normal sense of progressively
creating one's own future-and brought the patient to an understanding
of the basic problem.
Von Gebsattel analyzes the case of a boy who had a compulsion
for cleanliness and, though constantly engaged in washing himself,
never felt clean. He regards this patient as a person whose course
toward self-realization, towards Becoming, is inhibited. The heart
of a compulsion is not an irrational drive or mge, but essentially a
blockage. No progression is possible in such a life. It is bound to the
past; irrational guilt is slavery to the past. In the normal consciousness
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life purifies itself by moving ahead through time and uaalfUI:II!:
what was neglected or done poorly. In the compulsive '-'Vlu:sc:totiSQifllij•
life is bound to some moment in the past or to the past as
spending itself in the attempt to finish something which it
never finish to its satisfaction. Consequently the compulsive itna
is likely to be one of pollution versus cleanliness, the patient ~
futilely to clean up, tidy up his past so that he can some day direct
himself with a clean slate toward the future. His behavior
directed toward an Entwesen or de-essentialization, anti-ei
formlessness; all else that he encounters besides the Unform, the con..
pulsive symbol, is meaningless for his life. And he himself
oriented toward an Entwerden, a non-Becoming. In a sense he
losing his soul, because he is losing his life in spite of all his efforta
to reclaim it. The problem for therapy is not to rid him of the
compulsive behavior, to alleviate it in some way, but to achieve
a reconsb·uction of his consciousness, a new orientation to life.
A third type of phenomenology is Categorical phenomenolog.
Its aim is to reconsb·uct the inner world of the patient with respect
to the way he experiences time, space, causality and materiality.
Time is normally experienced as a flowing of life or Werdezell
("becoming time"). The normal person feels himself to be engaged
in Eigenaktivitat, connecting the past and the futme by his own
activity and inmost drive to activity in the present. The future is
"open" to him. He is projecting something more or less definite
into it, projecting himself into it; and it is coming to meet him,
bringing an expectation of fulfillment. Further, the normal
person's time is "in~erted into the social, historical and cosmic time,•
The mature person lives as a member of ever widening circles
of community, as he senses other Werdezeiten parallel to his own.
For some depressed persons time does not flow; the schizophrenic's time tends to be very slow or nearly to stand still. For the
manic, on the other hand, time races. The sense of Eigenaktivitat weakens for many schizoid patients; they are not actively connecting past
and futme. For tl1e maniac and many other psychopaths the future
is 110t "open" for them to project a plan into; rather it is empty. For
the depressed the future is "blocked." And the schizoid person
cannot insert his time into a social, historical or cosmic time, hfs
stream of consciousness is an isolated one.
Space, Ellenberger says, is not phenomenologically the isotropic
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. " amso.
'cs where equal distances are ali'ke. I t IS
at hema ti '
th'
.
pace , mh dimension has different values. And every . mg m
trOp ic -eac . 't ·elation to the body a mobile focal pomt. The
· felt 111 I s I
'
·
h
pace IS
ti 1 arrangement are meanings for the subject to w ~m
facts of spa ad L'mitations
distances, directions , roads, boundanes,
'
" · t d
relate · 1 ·
theV· are5 e1as ti' c1'ty are the categories of experienced
space, onen ed
.
dearn~s He cites Binswanger's concept of ge~tmmter Ra~m, attune .
spoce. whiC
. h ts· space characterized by ones own
feelmg tone or
.
. . ti
space,
. h It is felt as full or empty, expandmg or constr1c ng,
·
· di
f the
o•ional pitc ·
ern10·w or uc
.· h . Binswanger reports that m orgamc seases
d ·o
1
ho . the pa t'Jen t suffers deterioration of oriented space an m manbralll
. and schizoid cases deterioration of attuned space.
d
. .
. depresstve
. . f I
IC· Causa l'ty
· a third form of consciousness: 1t. IS e t. as eterrmmsm,
J
IS
.·
as intentionality. The melancholic pahent expenences
s chance or
1· 1
f · f·
d
a.!most
-'1
attsation
as determinism·' he has Itt e sense
01 1ee an
~u c
h
h
a
.
human intention. The manic tends to see c ance everyw ere,
conscwus
·
s
·d
.
h finds the future to be empty of meamng. orne paranOl
Just as e
·
h
·
th
·
intentions in nearly everythmg that appens,
ere IS
cases see
.h . .
. t ti
· ous will directing events at them Wit stmster fm en on. .
an orrun
,
The fourth form phenomenology discovers or . consciOusness
· J'ty in which there are variations ofb conststency,
.
IS matena I ,
.
t fcolor,
.
These
too
tend
to
e
cons1sten
011 a
lasticity
d
lightness an P
·
.
.
iven disorder. For instance, the manic tends to see m rose co Ol ,
g th than in the pervading black of the depressed state, and to
ra ereverywhere a lighh1ess, sofmess, resilience an d mu1ti'for~m.'ty .
sense
Erwin Sh·aus relates psychiatric data of all of these vaneties to
the various modes of confrontation, normal and abnormal. The
rimary fact of experience is that I, the real total person, confront
rhe object, the world, as the real Other. It is not just
senses or
specific nerve energies that encounter reality; and It Is not an
assorbnent of primary and secondary qualities that I confront.
Unlike many contemporary psychologists, Sh·aus does not .speak
of the I as an organism or an Ego, in the sense of a mere adjustor
between rival claims within the psyche. He starts from .the .fact of
relation. In experiencing the Other, what is important .Is dist~nce,
direction, besetment, and the possibility of my behavmg actively
toward it.
Like Husserl, Sh·aus uses the example of walking around a~
object, each view of it being experience~ equally .as a phase ?f ones
own existence in the continum of ones becommg. What IS most
0f

~1y.
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worth studying is the way in which one is gripped by the
and the way in which he addresses himself to it. One
experiences the actual in its limitation-in those aspects of
address themselves to his senses at the moment; and this uuuta,Ho.J
points beyond itself to a fuller possibility. Since a person CAI.Je1"1l-•.....c
his own time-sb·eam as Becoming, he expects to be able to aa11.,......,
himself to the object in the next moment and know more of
possibility. He expects to be able to act toward it reciprocally
to sense it in other ways as it further presents itself to him.
In some kinds of mental disorder Straus writes, "the character
of reality is lost, because things can no longer be integrated into
temporal order of personal existence," One of these derangelllentl
occurs in mescalin intoxication, which heightens the existence of
being influenced, overwhelmed and persecuted by the Other. Tbe
individual cannot reciprocate. He grows more and more passive,
and feels sensorily dependent on all that touches him. Time seems to
stop and space grows boundless.
Schizophrenia is another sort of breakdown of normal relations
with the Other. The patient, in encountering it, does not go out to
meet a reality which he expects to become more acquainted with
in each moment, while retaining his own integrity and entirety,
Instead, he experiences the world in a sequence of moments in which
he becomes overpowered. Voices speak to him, but not persons.
and these anonymous voices strike him violently. There are no
boundaries between things and no measure of boundary. There is
only the realm of the hostile Other and himself,, alone, defenseless.
paralyzed, unable to respond and interact with the Other. The
schizophrenic world is not a land of dreams withdrawn from reality,
but an alien reality engulfing the individual.
Schizophrenia, like all pathological variants of the basic relationship l-and-the-Other, is a distortion of the basic phenomenal
realities that give meaning to sense experience. The sense "modalities"
are distorted. Each of tt.ese-touch, sight, hearing,-has been discovered to have a certalli "phenomenological" way of occuring in a
life of normal encounters; for the nmmal consciousness each modality
has a certain way of imparting meaning which in pathological
states deviates from this nonn.
The tactile sense (which in normal encounter is felt as reciprocal)
becomes the experience of being touched or struck irrationally, from a
distance. Seeing (the sense in which a person is normally most active
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. )

·dering what be sees from a certain perspective
and autonomous, :~al hallucinations, a sense of being blinded by a
lflll\' occur as o~ ne or in some cases, of having images tru·own
li~tht direc:~d a(
mos't immediate of the sense modalities. in_ its
t or.e. So
l
the
one which most of all suggests continUity)
:l
but a so
. .
hi m· .
Jll istence
't pattern on a sequence m time. The sc zop emc
1
·
1
depen d5 for sd nses hostile powers like wmd
an d f'1re whi ch ' l'k
e
·ces an se
til ·
'bl
hears ~01 assault and penetrate him but remain vola e, mtangi e,
the voices,
di'stance and showing no logical or dependable proa . each mode of sense perception
·
' abil'ty
. · from
trtldng
Th
a persons
1
. n
us 1n
10
gres
nd meaningful encounters can break down.
·f .
ake 1ee a
.
torn
f these psychiatrists-though their te~hmques may varyAll o . . tl tudy of this human capacity for real encounter,
. neenng 111 lc s
k
d .
are p•o . 1•t failures And they share a common hac groun m
treat1Dg s
·
I' · ·u· 1
an d
. 0 f phenomenology. They set out from Husser s Im a
theOJY
h
"b
·
k
t"
th
·
"
the
. t "phenomenological reduction. T ey 1 ac e
e na turaltandpom
·
f
·
.
f · w which b·ies to evaluate consciOusness wm th e ou t. f pO!Dt 0 VIC '
th h lth
I IC " b'
·d 0 JCC ti' ve1y." They try to discover 1) what stance . e ea .y
51 e,
k to the world and his life and 2) how thiS stance 1S
erson ta es
d 1· ·
d th
p
· th specific modes of experience-the sense mo a 1ties an
e
taken m e
forms of space, time, cause and matter.
.
.
Like Husserl these psychiatrists assert that consciOusness giVes
form to what it lives; it makes real the eidos of the worl~ encountered
nd of its own existence. Existence, having soul or cons~wusness, mu~t
a te essence, or it desb·oys itself. The phenomenologis~ regards t e
cre:Son as responsible for his own becoming, and he tnes to unde~
!'::nd and heal breakdowns in that responsibility. H~ sh~re~ th1s
ense of the crisis of Being or Nothingness with the eXlstentialist.
Phenomenology differs most basically from other. types of psychology such as behaviorism, interbehaviorism, biosoc1al theory and
neo-Freudianism, by trying to cope with that vague but total a~p~ct
1 111
of personality, consciousness itself. Its m~thod i~ not a redu~~ ~ :!
one. Rather, its dangers lie in the totahty of 1ts scope, w. 1c
nothing less than the entire orientation of the person to eXIStence.
Its promise is certainly great, if only because it is fin~g a way to
understand and heal mental disorder by a method whiCh s~ts out
from a sense of ti1e dignity and significant destiny of human l~e and
a conviction of man's ability to make significant encou~ters w1th t~e
Other over-against him. In view of the forces active today m
dichotomizing, mechanizing and isolating man, phenomenology seems
to hold a promise well worth pursuing.
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